Cities of commerce, cities of constraints. International trade, government institutions and the law of commerce in later medieval Bruges and the Burgundian state. by Dumolyn,  Jan & Lambert,  Bart
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
27 March 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Dumolyn, Jan and Lambert, Bart (2014) 'Cities of commerce, cities of constraints. International trade,
government institutions and the law of commerce in later medieval Bruges and the Burgundian state.',
Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis. = Low Countries journal of social and economic history.,
11 (4). pp. 89-102.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.18352/tseg.171
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
http://www.tseg.nl/2014-4/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Cities of Commerce, Cities of Constraints: 
International Trade, Government Institutions and the Law of Commerce in Later 
Medieval Bruges and the Burgundian State 
Jan Dumolyn (Ghent University) and Bart Lambert (Durham University) 
 
Introduction 
In New Institutional Economics (hereafter NIE), the emergence of open access institutions, 
arrangements that protected all merchants, is considered as paramount for the growth of 
European trade during the pre-industrial period. Scholars such as Douglass North, Barry 
Weingast and Daron Acemoglu attributed this institutional change to the development of 
territorial states, as these had the military means and the legal power to solve the fundamental 
problems of violence and opportunism that threatened commercial exchange. Others, 
including Avner Greif, emphasised the role of so-called ‘private order solutions’, such as peer 
pressure, the prospect of repeat transactions and the formation of guilds in the expansion of 
trade.
1
 Both approaches provide important explanatory elements, but at the same time have 
empirical weaknesses and fail to take into account the contribution of alternative institutional 
levels to the organisation of international commerce in politically more fragmented societies. 
From this perspective, Oscar Gelderblom’s Cities of Commerce is a welcome contribution to 
the debate. The author takes an original and audacious stand: he claims that it was, in fact, the 
competition between urban centres that tried to attract trade which prompted cities to 
continuously adapt their legal, commercial and financial institutions to the needs of 
international merchants. Concentrating on the Low Countries between 1250 and 1650, he 
fully acknowledges the crucial municipal involvement in key issues such as the creation and 
maintenance of basic commercial infrastructure and market space, the reduction of bargaining 
and information costs, price regulation, the standardisation of weights and measures and 
quality control. The question arises, however, whether, by righting one wrong, he has not 
created another. Gelderblom still shares with the authors inspired by NIE a strongly mono-
causal point of view. Determined to replace the state or private order solutions by the city as 
the prime mover of institutional change, he credits urban authorities with nearly all beneficial 
influences on international trade and he reduces the role of the central government to an 
exclusively negative one. This, we shall argue, does just as little justice to the institutional 
framework of commercial exchange in the later medieval Low Countries as the theories he 
aims to reconsider. To demonstrate this, we will focus on the first part of the book which 
deals with the commercial metropolis of Bruges between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
Commercial Litigation before Urban and Central Courts 
Already in 1986, the renowned legal historian Baker wrote that it was ‘a major 
misapprehension’ of historians that international merchants in medieval Europe exclusively 
sought justice in their urban tribunals and did not go to central courts.
2
 Gelderblom, on the 
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other hand, discards of these central legal institutions: ‘The legal exploits of the new rulers 
did not help much either because the judges of their central court never managed to settle 
business disputes quickly and according to mercantile customs’ (p. 198) and ‘the creation of 
central courts, first by the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers and then by the United Provinces, 
seems to have played no role whatsoever in the governance of international trade’ (p. 126). 
Even though the Flemish counts systematically legislated matters of international trade since 
the very beginning of Bruges’ rise as a North-Sea metropolis, the comital courts of Flanders 
were not strongly developed yet during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Since the end 
of the fourteenth century, however, the political position of the prince grew stronger and 
litigation touching upon international commerce was increasingly dealt with by the central 
courts. The Council of Flanders treated complaints by merchants on the abuse of power by 
receivers and judicial officers such as bailiffs, who were ratione personae under its 
competence, as well as criminal cases against street robbers who had attacked merchants on 
the roads. Since the end of the fourteenth century, but for the bigger cities increasingly so 
since the 1450s and 1460s, appeals (reformaciën) were lodged with the comital Audientie and 
its successor, the Council of Flanders, against verdicts of Flemish urban aldermen. In fact, 
according to the brilliant medieval Flemish jurist Philip Wielant, the procedure of reformation 
had been introduced ‘in favour of justice and commerce’.3 However, the Council of Flanders 
could also use renvoi (reference) when a legal dispute was about a personal claim. This was in 
fact often the case: the central court would send commercial cases back to the aldermen of 
Bruges.
4
 This seems to support Gelderblom’s point about the latter’s specialization in 
commercial affairs but at the same time shows that merchants not only sought justice before 
urban tribunals. Other central courts must be taken into account as well: the Chambre des 
Comptes in Lille possessed jurisdiction when princely rights concerning offices, matters of 
demesne, money and ducal taxes or aides were at stake.
5
 The Burgundian Great Council was 
competent ratione materiae for disputes concerning princely charters, including the privileges 
for the nations of foreign merchants. It also oversaw conflicts concerning comital toll rights, 
lettres de marque for privateering and matters of coinage. The Great Council could equally 
evoke cases omisso medio (in other words: skipping the level of the Council of Flanders) 
directly from the aldermen of Bruges if a party requested this.
6
 
Whereas Gelderblom’s conclusions about the role of central courts in sixteenth and 
seventeenth-century Amsterdam are based on a thorough analysis of primary material (pp. 
130-131), his assertions about the later medieval Low Countries draw on rather ill-chosen 
samples borrowed from other studies, such as Marie-Charlotte Le Bailly’s study of a limited 
number of years of litigation before the fifteenth-century Council of Holland, which, 
obviously, is irrelevant to cases from Bruges. He also makes quantifications of the number of 
cases before the Burgundian Great Council/Council of Malines, using only one, published, 
type of source to find out what exactly was at stake, which procedures were used and in what 
ways this would have given rise to precedents.
7
 The Council of Flanders is very briefly 
mentioned (p. 127) and then neglected throughout the rest of the part on Bruges. This whereas 
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both central institutions have left a wealth of primary material waiting to be studied,
8
 
numerous cases before the Bruges aldermen bear traces of intervention by these higher courts
9
 
and registers dealing specifically with civil litigation from Bruges in appeal before the 
Council of Flanders have been preserved.
10
 Among them are many instances of arbitration, 
settlements reached midway procedure or cases referred back to other courts, which were not 
systematically registered in the series used by Gelderblom. In the massive amount of sources 
left by the Chambre des Comptes of Lille, not discussed in Cities of Commerce, foreign 
merchants appear on many occasions in disputes concerning, for instance, toll rights and as 
creditors to the prince or his officers. To give but one typical example, in 1421, the Bruges 
aldermen referred the case concerning the debts of the Lucchese businessman Bartolomeo 
Bettini to a Burgundian receiver to the Chambre des Comptes because, they argued, ‘the 
competence belongs to you’.11 In the county of Flanders, foreign merchants often used the 
authority of the French Parlement de Paris as the highest court of appeal to obtain redress of a 
decision before the urban or central courts. The Parlement’s sentences following Flemish 
appeals have been calendared for the whole later medieval period and include many verdicts 
on international trade in Bruges.
12
  
It can, of course, not be denied that the Bruges urban courts did play an essential role 
in the organisation of international trade as contract-enforcing institutions. Already since the 
thirteenth century, the local bench of aldermen developed a complex and solid legal 
framework tuned to the needs of the international merchant community. Determined not to 
kill the goose that laid the golden eggs, the municipal authorities displayed a remarkable 
flexibility in the resolution of commercial conflicts, delegating decision-making authority to 
the foreign communities, and accepted the laws and customs of merchants’ hometowns, at 
least within the course of the nations’ consular jurisdiction. 13  This flexibility was only 
maintained, however, as long as it fitted in with the governing classes’ own economic and 
other interests. In cases involving the staple rights, which made buying and selling of all but 
some of the goods in the city obligatory, the Bruges courts never showed any leniency. If 
necessary, the magistrates were not afraid of unmistakable power politics and rent-seeking 
either. Appeal cases brought before the higher courts contain multiple references to urban 
attempts at intimidating one of the parties and in one instance, the city simply closed one of 
the Italian nation houses until it got its way.
14
 
According to Gelderblom, governments of ‘cities of commerce’ such as Bruges 
provided merchants with a speedier and more reliable administration of justice than central 
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institutions because they were ‘so good ad adapting their legal systems to the changing needs 
of foreign traders’ (p. 126). In his account, the relationship between law and commerce is, 
thus, a very straightforward one: commercial litigation before urban courts follows economic 
change, as it were, in quite an unproblematic way. However, legal scholars such as Dave De 
Ruysscher have always emphasized the autonomy, or at least the partial autonomy, of the 
development of law: even if economic change influences legal developments, it is jurists and 
courts, and not merchants, who develop and elaborate on legal rules, and they do not simply 
adapt these to current economic necessities but ground them within a logic proper to law 
itself.
 15
 One would expect a bold claim as the one Gelderblom makes for Bruges to be based 
on a thorough empirical analysis of the available sources. Instead, the author only considers 
an increase in cases during the 1330s which, in reality, is an increase in cases of criminal and 
not civil law
16
 and asserts that ‘it is difficult to establish what kind of disputes the aldermen’s 
bench settled’ (p. 109), before jumping immediately to sixteenth-century ordinances and then 
to seventeenth-century Antwerp law. In other words, the interplay between institutional 
arrangements and the requirements of international trade in later medieval Bruges remains to 
be revealed. 
We believe that Oscar Gelderblom has missed an opportunity to be innovative here. 
The sources on civil cases in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Bruges are scarce, but for the 
fifteenth century, the period the author is most interested in, they are, in fact, more abundantly 
available. Notably the civiele sententiën pronounced by the bench of aldermen (conserved for 
several intervals during the fifteenth century) offer possibilities for quantification and provide 
vital clues to reconstruct procedures. In 1469, a Castilian merchant quoted almost literally 
from the general reformation procedures prescribed by ‘the laws and customs of Flanders’ in 
order to prevent a case from being reopened. In many more instances it is specified that 
commercial litigation before the bench needed to follow local laws.
17
 Town cartularies in the 
Bruges city archives with a specific focus on trade include earlier verdicts of the Bruges 
aldermen, as well as relevant urban and princely legislation and sentences from central and 
foreign courts. Many of these texts have already been collected and published (Louis 
Gilliodts-Van Severen’s diligently composed Cartulaire de l’ancienne estaple contains 
hundreds of relevant documents)
18
 but still await systematic study. Legal treatises such as 
Wielant’s Practijcke Civile (which Gelderblom mentions in passing) and Joos de 
Damhouder’s Praxis Rerum Civilium provide learned comments on the ‘style’ of both the 
central and urban courts.
19
 Studied in an integrated fashion, these sources would allow 
scholars to establish how adaptive to the needs of international traders in later medieval 
Bruges each institutional level really was. 
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The City and the State: the Political Context of International Trade 
Cities of Commerce does not only dismiss the potential impact of the state when it comes to 
commercial litigation and the competences of particular courts. In other, often crucial, 
passages of the book the author also glosses over the specific political context in which 
international trade in the later medieval Low Countries was organised. On several occasions 
(pp. 109-110, 171, 196), Gelderblom states that it was the city that accorded or confirmed the 
privileges which provided the fundamental framework that set out the confines of commercial 
exchange to the foreign merchant communities. However, resting on the princely prerogative 
of safe-conducts for merchants already dating from the early Middle Ages, privileges in the 
later medieval Low Countries were granted at the discretion of the count and, after the 
Burgundian accession in 1385, of the duke. Cities could lobby with the central authorities to 
have their desiderata represented but, in the end, the content and the circumstances of the 
grant, including the fact whether or not the recipients would enjoy consular jurisdiction, 
depended on the interests of the prince and his relationship with the foreign merchant 
communities or, more frequently, their home government. This variable was often responsible 
for the time-lag which the author observed between the presence of foreign groups in the city 
and the moment when specific rights were bestowed on them. In 1414, for instance, the 
Genoese merchants in Bruges were able to take advantage of the precarious position of Duke 
John the Fearless, caught up in the battle for control over the French monarchy, and obtained 
very liberal privileges in exchange for a handsome loan. Seven years later John’s successor 
Philip the Good confirmed the grant but, in the context of recovering Burgundian power and 
complaints about the concessions to the Genoese, did not have them registered with the 
Chambre des Comptes. This made the privileges void and plunged the Genoese merchants in 
Bruges in a legal vacuum, exposed to arbitrary arrests and confiscations of their property. 
Philip the Good had them hanging on for a few more years and only in 1434, with the 
Genoese authorities on their knees, granted new rights. These were considerably more 
restricted than the original ones and implied the payment of a tax on all Genoese imports. The 
role of the city in this twenty-year episode was, in fact, non-existent.
20
  
The difference in bargaining power between the prince and the city is all too clear in 
the way in which commercial boycotts by the foreign merchants were dealt with. Between 
1280 and the end of the fifteenth century, the Hanseatic League left Bruges six times in order 
to push forward a more favourable treatment of its traders, campaigns which are discussed at 
length in Gelderblom’s book (pp. 170-180). The response to these ‘collective actions’ by the 
city, however, was limited to arrangements for financial and other material compensations 
and commitments to respect the Hanseatic rights, but never brought about substantial 
adaptations of their legal, commercial and financial institutions. Only when the Flemish count 
or, after 1385, the Burgundian duke was involved, did the Hanseatic boycotts result in a 
confirmation or extension of their privileges. This dependency on the prince and the 
expansion of the territories under his jurisdiction in the Burgundian period, soon covering 
nearly all of the Low Countries, explain the difficulties of the Hansards and other foreign 
merchant communities to fully exploit urban competition. Referring to successful collective 
actions of foreign merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Gelderblom counters 
this argument, advocated by, among others, Blockmans, Prevenier and Dollinger,
21
 by 
claiming that the effects of political unification are limited as long as cities are sufficiently 
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autonomous to negotiate with traders (p. 179). It must be clear that, apart from some rare 
moments when comital power was at its weakest at the beginning of the thirteenth century or 
during the period of James of Artevelde (1338-1345), later medieval Bruges simply was not.  
In the Low Countries between 1250 and 1500, urban authorities provided market 
infrastructure, took care of transport networks and oversaw weights and measures, but the 
general climate of investment in industry and trade, including military, political, legal, fiscal 
and monetary security, fell under the authority of the prince. Flemish towns were no Italian 
city states or even Hanseatic towns: their autonomy remained limited and they always had to 
negotiate with princely power. Especially under the rule of the Valois Dukes, their political 
position vis à vis the prince was further weakened. It was, for example, Duke Philip the Good 
who, between 1433 and 1473, guaranteed a period of forty years of monetary stability that 
was particularly beneficial to the development of trade. The Burgundian and later the 
Habsburg state could enforce the law and provide physical and legal security to merchants at a 
much more extensive geographical level than the cities could, an advantage that only 
increased as territorial unification went on. This role of the sovereign was also acknowledged 
as such by contemporaries. Between 1435 and 1495, the Genoese authorities, in charge of one 
of Bruges’ most important trading partners, only addressed the city council when the interests 
of one of their subjects before the urban courts were at stake. Letters concerning all other 
matters, including the violation of privileges, were directed towards the Burgundian duke.
22
 
When, during the political troubles of 1488, the representative body of Bruges burghers and 
craft guilds presented a list of demands it wanted to be met, it expected the prince to shape the 
right conditions for commerce, not their own urban government.
23
 
If the urban authorities were not capable of substantially altering the institutional 
framework of international trade when confronted with the departure of the Hanseatic League, 
one of the most indispensable commercial powers, to another city, then when were they? 
From at least the 1430s onwards, Bruges was aware that Antwerp, an urban competitor within 
the Low Countries, attracted an increasing part of its commercial activity: during the periods 
in which the fairs in the Brabantine city took place, trade in the Zwin town came to a 
standstill. The authorities did not react by improving institutions for merchants within its own 
walls, but launched a protectionist campaign and sent out envoys along Flemish roads who 
had to catch and fine Bruges burghers on their way to and from Antwerp. Only during the last 
quarter of the fifteenth century can we discern a consistent urban policy that had the intention 
of lowering transaction costs for traders in the city. Copying an earlier Antwerp measure, 
Bruges paid an annual sum to the ducal treasury to exempt all of its foreign visitors from 
princely tolls in the Zwin estuary and the port of Sluys from 1479 onwards. Two years later, it 
bought the right to collect the Great Toll in the Bruges harbour from the noble van 
Luxemburg family.
24
 It is exactly this period, however, which most strikingly illustrates the 
limitations of the urban authorities in meeting the needs of international traders. Confronted 
with a prince who now explicitly targeted the city’s merchant communities to serve his 
political interests and with the changing economic geography, the measures had little effect. 
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In 1499, when the toll contract came to an end, all but some of the foreign groups had left 
Bruges for Antwerp.
25
 
Remarkably enough, Gelderblom largely neglects the role of exactly those channels 
through which the city did have a voice in the prince’s policy: that of the representative 
institutions. The thirteenth-century Scabini Flandriae were not, as he claims, a judicial body 
or ‘jury’ (p. 181) but a consultative organ consisting of the five major Flemish towns that 
discussed the course of events in the county with the prince.
26
 They, thus, illustrate the 
opposite of what the author wants to prove: rather than urban autonomy, they bear witness to 
the century-old Flemish tradition of complementarity and consultation between the central 
and urban authorities when it came to resolving commercial issues. As a representative 
institution, the Scabini were the precursors to the Four Members of Flanders, the 
representative assembly involving the cities of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres and the rural district 
around Bruges, which, throughout the whole Burgundian period, discussed matters of state 
with the duke. It was there that economic policies including relations with foreign merchants 
were discussed and where the urban elites and the princely administration could negotiate on 
how to deal with these problems in the mutual interest of both parties. Also debated were 
commercial disputes that were deemed too sensitive to be judged by the urban courts and 
were taken away from the course of urban jurisdiction. After deliberations of the Members of 
Flanders, a judgment would then be confirmed by the duke.
27
 
We should ask ourselves whether it is opportune to make such rigid distinctions 
between urban and central institutions in the first place. Throughout his book, Gelderblom 
seems to consider ‘urban governments’ as undifferentiated monoliths with homogenous 
interests. Depending on the specific constellation of power, medieval city councils were made 
up of factions with their own, particular motivations. The brokers and hostellers, whose 
fundamental role in Bruges’ commerce was demonstrated by Jim Murray,28 often fostered 
interests that ran parallel with those of foreign merchants, but the producing classes, which 
included not only artisans but also rich drapers, had others. They, too, were represented in the 
urban institutions of Bruges. At the same time, some members of these Bruges commercial 
elites had interests in Antwerp, the city’s most energetic urban competitor for most of the 
fifteenth century.
29
 The author equally underestimates the degree, certainly during the 
Burgundian period, to which the Bruges political elites of hostellers and merchants were 
intertwined with the state apparatus, as is shown by extensive prosopographical research.
30
 
The aldermen passing the sentences in the urban courts that play such a crucial part in 
Gelderblom’s account needed to be appointed and approved by ducal commissioners each 
year and only during limited periods in the fourteenth century did the Bruges elites have a 
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degree of autonomy in appointing the aldermen independently from the count. Even then, 
initiative lay with the guild masters, rather than the commercial elites of hostellers, brokers 
and merchants, who usually sided with comital power and did not demand more urban 
autonomy. Since 1384, the Burgundian state, from the beginning strongly supported by the 
commercial class in the Flemish towns, fully realised the value of the expertise on 
international trade and banking present in Bruges and made extensive use of it.
31
 Many of its 
central ad hoc commissions that dealt with international commerce involved financial 
specialists that had served in local courts. If we take into account the enormous overlap in the 
networks of agents behind the institutions in Bruges and those on a higher level, it seems fair 
to say that the majority of those making up Gelderblom’s ‘urban governments’ had other 
interests than to provide for the ideal institutional framework for international trade in one 
city. 
Conclusions 
Revaluating the role played by urban institutions in the reduction of transaction costs during 
the pre-modern period was highly necessary. Peter Stabel had already suggested that the 
institutional framework of international trade in the Low Countries during the Burgundian-
Habsburg period was one characterised by subsidiarity of the central and local levels, 
complemented by private-order solutions, rather than one dominated by an all-imposing 
state.
32
 From this point of view, Cities of Commerce certainly is a step forward, stressing the 
importance of urban courts in reducing transaction costs for international merchants. We 
believe, however, that, motivated by a tendency to take up an original position in the current 
historiographical debate which is still dominated by the orthodoxy of North and Thomas’ Rise 
of the Western World, the way in which the author has approached this problem is as 
teleological as most of the contributions he opposes. He assumes ever improving market 
conditions and replaces the causal primacy of the state by that of the city. These assumptions 
have made him seriously overestimate the autonomy of Bruges’ judicial and political 
institutions and neglect the positive impact of many arrangements made by the central 
Burgundian administration. The only way forward in the debate, we argue, is an empirical 
one. Rather than considering legal institutions as a mere function of market development, the 
law of commerce and the strategies developed by foreign merchants must be studied from a 
legal-historical point of view, taking into account all the types of courts available for conflict 
resolution, as well as their alternatives.
33
 Oscar Gelderblom’s book is not convincing when he 
deals with the first ‘city of commerce’, later medieval Bruges, but he has certainly had the 
merit of starting an interesting debate. 
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